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HUNT V. KENAI PENINSULA 
BOROUGH: THE SEARCH FOR 
CLARITY IN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
SPEAKER SELECTION 
Charles Truslow & Craig Jones* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2016, three residents of the Kenai Peninsula Borough were prevented from 
delivering an invocation at a Borough Assembly meeting because they were 
neither borough chaplains nor members of a qualifying religious association. 
These three residents sued the borough, claiming that the Borough Assembly’s 
speaker selection policy violated the Alaska Constitution’s Establishment 
Clause. The superior court ruled for the plaintiffs, holding that the selection 
policy constituted a step towards the establishment of a state religion. Applying 
Supreme Court precedent, the superior court reached the correct result. 
However, the limited amount of federal precedent on the principles guiding 
speaker selection policies has led to significant variance of application in 
different jurisdictions.  Important questions remain regarding the scope of 
legislative prayer doctrine in Alaska, which still need to be addressed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly (the Assembly) 
instituted a policy partially restricting who could deliver the Assembly’s 
invocation.1 Three plaintiffs who were prevented from delivering an 
invocation sued, arguing that the policy violated Alaska’s religious 
establishment clause.2  The superior court ruled for the plaintiffs, finding 
the Assembly’s policy “stemmed from intolerance for the controversial 
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   1.  Hunt v. Kenai Borough Peninsula, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 3 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with author). The case was decided by Judge 
Andrew Peterson, who was appointed to the Third Judicial District in 2018. Alaska 
Judges, Alaska Court System, http://courts.alaska.gov/judges/ (last visited Mar. 
25, 2019). 
 2.  Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 4. 
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views expressed during two particular invocations.”3  Interpreting 
Bonjour v. Bonjour,4 and subsequent Supreme Court cases, the superior 
court concluded that Alaska’s Establishment Clause need not be 
interpreted more broadly than the federal Establishment Clause.5  
Therefore, the court applied the only two cases the Supreme Court has 
decided on the issue of legislative prayer:6 Marsh v. Chambers7 and Town 
of Greece v. Galloway.8  The Hunt court was largely successful in doing so 
but failed to fully clarify important points regarding religious affiliation, 
the scope of discrimination, and first amendment principles. 
This Comment provides a brief survey of notable interpretative 
approaches to Marsh and Greece in order to critique the approach in Hunt.  
Part II describes the important facts and holdings of the Hunt case.  Part 
III discusses the legal background of Marsh, Greece, and other important 
legislative prayer cases.  Finally, Part IV contrasts the approach in Hunt 
to that of other legislative prayer cases discussed in Part III.  We conclude 
by reiterating the importance of further clarification on the issue of 
legislative prayer in Alaska. 
II. HUNT V. KENAI BOROUGH PENINSULA 
In 2016, the Assembly adopted a “first come, first served” practice, 
in order to expand the pool of invocation speakers.9  This resulted in two 
controversial invocations, one of which ended with the phrase “Hail 
Satan,” which in turn created further complaints.10 
To address the complaints, the Assembly introduced a speaker 
selection policy which became the subject of the Hunt case:11 
To ensure that [] (the “invocation speaker”) is selected from 
among a wide pool of representatives . . . : 
 
The Clerk shall post a notice on the borough internet home page 
that all religious associations with an established presence in the 
Kenai Peninsula Borough that regularly meet for the primary 
purpose of sharing a religious perspective, or chaplains who 
may serve one of [sic] more of the fire departments, law 
enforcement agencies, hospitals, or other similar organizations 
 
 3.  Id. at 18. 
 4.  Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1236 n.3 (Alaska 1979). 
 5.  Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 9. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 8.  572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
 9.  Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 3. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 4. 
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in the borough, are eligible to provide invocations to the 
assembly, and that the authorized leader of any such association 
or chaplain can submit a written request to provide an 
invocation to the borough clerk.12 
After the adoption of the resolution, three borough residents sought to 
provide an invocation, but their requests were rejected as they were not 
members of a qualifying religious association or borough chaplains.13 
Lance Hunt was an atheist, Iris Fontana was a twenty-seven year old 
Kenai Peninsula College student and member of the Satanic Temple,14 
and Elise Boyer was Jewish.15 
In response to their rejection, the three sued the Assembly, alleging, 
amongst other claims, that the Assembly’s policy violated the Alaska 
Constitution’s establishment clause.16  Alaska’s establishment clause 
provides that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of 
religion.”17  Noting that the Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed the 
issue of legislative prayer under Alaska’s establishment clause, the 
superior court relied exclusively on federal law and limited its inquiry to 
the narrow issue of whether the requirements in the Assembly’s policy 
constitute an impermissible establishment of religion.18 
The court explained that the establishment clause “not only 
prohibit[s] the establishment of a state religion, it prohibits laws that act 
as a step towards the establishment of a state religion.”19 The Hunt court 
determined that the Assembly’s policy “excludes minority faiths from 
participating in the invocation practice.”20  The court further reasoned 
that “[t]he goal behind legislative invocations . . . is the idea that people 
of many faiths may be united in a community of tolerance and 
 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. All three members were denied for not belonging to a “qualifying 
religious association” as defined under the policy. Id. No further definition for 
“established presence” or “regularly meet” is established in Hunt. 
 14.  Daysha Eaton, Kenai Assembly Considers Moment of Silence After Satanic 
Prayer, Protest, Counter-Protest, ALASKA PUBLIC MEDIA (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2016/08/23/kenai-assembly-considers-
moment-of-silence-after-satanic-prayer-protest-counter-protest/. 
 15.  Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 4. 
 16.  Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 5–6. 
 17.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4. The relevant portion of the federal 
Establishment Clause is identical. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 18.  See Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 7–8. 
 19.  Id. at 7. 
 20.  Id. at 17. 
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devotion.”21  The court found the Assembly’s policy was contrary to this 
goal, as it stemmed from intolerance of certain controversial views.22 
Finally, the court impliedly provided a rule outlining what future 
behavior assemblies may engage in.  The court stated that after “opening 
the invocation opportunity to all residents, [the assembly] cannot then put 
in place requirements that in effect exclude minority faiths or beliefs.”23  
The court stated that the Assembly “has made clear that the resolution 
stemmed from intolerance for the controversial views expressed during 
two particular invocations.”24  Furthermore, the court held that the 
establishment clause only allows the prevention of an invocation speaker 
“where [the speaker has] exploited the invocation opportunity to 
proselytize, advance, or disparage any faith or belief.”25 
Ruling for the Plaintiffs, the court concluded that the invocation 
policy adopted by the Assembly was not inclusive enough under Greece, 
where “no faith was excluded by law, nor any favored.”26 
III. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER IN ALASKA: MARSH, GREECE AND THEIR 
PROGENY 
A. Alaska’s Legislative Prayer Tradition 
Legislative prayer has been a routine practice of Alaskan legislatures 
since the first session of the Alaska Constitutional Convention which 
opened with an invocation by Reverend Roy Ahmogak.27  He prayed, 
“[e]nlighten [the delegates] with wisdom from above and especially in 
establishing our Constitution.”28 Today, both houses of the Alaska 
Legislature open their sessions with prayer.29  However, local practices 
differ across the state,30 and these practices have occasionally prompted 
controversy.  An invocation was officially adopted as a standing item on 
 
 21.  Id. (citing Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 134 S. Ct. 1811 
(2014)). 
 22.  Id. at 18. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 16. 
 27.  Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention [hereinafter PACC], 
at 594, available at http://www.akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/Constitutional 
Convention/Proceedings/Proceedings%20-%20Complete.pdf. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See, e.g., H.R. 29-2015-01-20, 1st Sess., at 2 (Alaska 2015). 
 30.  For instance, the Anchorage Assembly does not typically begin their 
meetings with prayer.  See, e.g., MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, ASSEMBLY AGENDA 
(Jan. 29, 2019), http://anchorageak.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.php?file= 
anchorageak_8c975b90c15359e11fc4eebcfcfb6e32.pdf&view=1. 
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the Fairbanks North Star Borough Assembly agenda in 2001.31  Before 
that, invocations were traditionally offered, but not officially a part of the 
agenda.32  In 2017, a proposal to remove the invocation from the 
Assembly’s agenda failed by one vote after hours of testimony and debate 
over the role of religion in civic life and the freedom of individuals to 
express their religion publicly.33  It is worth bearing in mind that while 
legislative prayer has a long history in Alaska, it has prompted discord at 
times. 
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Legislative Prayer & the 
Establishment Clause 
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of legislative prayer 
twice.  First, in Marsh, the court held Nebraska’s legislative prayer 
practice to be constitutional.34  Nebraska’s legislature opened their 
sessions with a prayer by a state employed chaplain, chosen with 
legislative approval.35  Chief Justice Burger observed that over time “the 
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become a part of 
the fabric of our society.”36  Thirty years later, the court tackled the 
question of prayer at local government meetings in Greece, finding that 
the town of Greece’s practice of opening its council meetings with 
invocations by local clergy was consistent with the Establishment 
Clause.37  Marsh and Greece have collectively established that sectarian 
legislative prayer is constitutional at all levels of government.  However, 
these cases leave important practical matters unresolved. 
One key open question is: who is required to have the opportunity to 
deliver an invocation?  The issue of speaker selection took a backseat in 
both Marsh and Greece to other pressing issues like whether legislative 
prayer is constitutional at all and whether it is required to be nonsectarian.  
The Nebraska Legislature employed the same Presbyterian minister to 
 
 31.  Amanda Bohman, Local Issue Breakdown: Should the Borough Nix its 
Invocation?, FAIRBANKS NEWS-MINER (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.newsminer.com 
/news/local_news/local-issue-breakdown-should-the-borough-assembly-nix-
its-invocation/article_f5d8e848-1aa2-11e7-b2e7-af395b5bf773.html (citing local 
history research performed by Borough Clerk Nanci Ashford-Bingham). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Amanda Bohman, Borough Assembly Votes to Keep Prayer at Meetings, 
FAIRBANKS NEWS-MINER (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www.newsminer.com/news/ 
local_news/borough-assembly-votes-to-keep-prayer-at-meetings/article_ 
f60a5e36-20ed-11e7-86a8-4b32b8f52fc0.html. 
 34.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
 35.  Id. at 784. 
 36.  Id. at 792. 
 37.  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570. 
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deliver invocations for sixteen years.38  In Marsh, the Court accepted this 
practice because in their estimation, the chaplain’s long tenure reflected 
his “performance and personal qualities” rather than “an impermissible 
motive.”39  While that phrase is not defined specifically, the Court 
suggested that the advancement of one religion would be an 
“impermissible motive.”40 
In Greece, the Court faced a more complicated issue of speaker 
selection.  The town had traditionally solicited volunteers to give the 
invocation by calling local congregations (almost all of which were 
Christian) listed in the phone book.41  When this practice prompted 
complaints from non-Christian citizens, the town allowed a Jewish 
layman, the chairman of the local Baha’i temple, and a Wiccan priestess 
to deliver invocations after they requested the council’s permission.42  The 
Court found this speaker selection regime acceptable, summarizing its 
holding as follows: 
The town made reasonable efforts to identify all of the 
congregations located within its borders and represented that it 
would welcome a prayer by any minister or layman who wished 
to give one . . . So long as the town maintains a policy of 
nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search 
beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to 
achieve religious balancing.43 
This is the clearest statement from the Supreme Court directly addressing 
the selection of speakers in legislative prayer.  The standard the Court 
chose places enormous weight on whether a speaker selection policy is 
discriminatory, without much guidance as to where that line should be 
drawn.  However, First Amendment jurisprudence from other contexts 
sheds light on how the nondiscrimination principle should be applied. 
1. The Distinct Doctrines of Legislative Prayer 
 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that because of the long history 
and tradition of legislative prayer, it merits different treatment from other 
Establishment Clause contexts.44  It is true that the Marsh court declined 
 
 38.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 571. 
 42.  Id. at 572. 
 43.  Id. at 585–86 (emphasis added). 
 44.  See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (“In this context, historical evidence sheds light 
not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but 
36.1 TRUSLOW-JONES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  2:00 PM 
2019 HUNT V. KENAI PENINSULA 125 
to apply long standing Establishment Clause precedent, including Lemon 
v. Kurtzman.45  But the Court has not squarely held that this history 
entirely severs the legislative prayer context from traditional 
Establishment Clause doctrine.46 
It is impractical to hermetically seal legislative prayer, isolating it 
from the broader context of First Amendment jurisprudence, for several 
reasons.  First, Marsh and Greece explicitly call on courts to make a fact 
specific inquiry into each prayer opportunity.47  More importantly, the 
standards set forth in those two cases are insufficiently precise to 
workably govern the broad range of issues raised by fact specific analyses 
of the many varied legislative practices.  Addressing these issues by 
creating special, separate doctrines for the legislative prayer arena would 
be inconsistent and possibly confusing.  Further, treating legislative 
prayer like an island cut off from the rest of the First Amendment is 
counterproductive because it deprives this specific context of insights 
gained over decades spent interpreting the contours of the Establishment 
Clause.  Rather than creating new standards from whole cloth, it is 
appropriate to seek guidance from other religious clause precedents to 
illuminate the impermissible motive and nondiscrimination standards of 
Marsh and Greece.  Two doctrines that would be especially helpful to 
incorporate are: the prevention of religious gerrymanders, and the 
prohibition on discriminating between denominations. 
2. Facially Neutral Discrimination 
 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed religious clause 
principles that could be useful in fortifying Greece’s “nondiscrimination” 
requirement.  Legislative prayer jurisprudence should acknowledge the 
problem of religious gerrymandering, whereby facially neutral policies 
are crafted to exclude disfavored religious views.48  Otherwise, local 
governments will be able to skirt the requirements of Marsh and Greece by 
enacting ostensibly neutral policies that exclude controversial invocation 
speakers.  The Supreme Court has already addressed this problem in 
other Establishment Clause contexts. 
 
also on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the 
First Congress—their actions reveal their intent.”). 
 45.  403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 46.  See Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 (“Yet Marsh must not be understood as 
permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its 
historical foundation.”). 
 47.  Id.  at 587 (“The inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both 
the setting in which the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”). 
 48.  See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (identifying the 
problem of religious gerrymandering). 
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In Gillette v. United States,49  Justice Marshall clearly rejected a facial 
neutrality standard: “The question of governmental neutrality is not 
concluded by the observation that [the statute] on its face makes no 
discrimination between religions, for the Establishment Clause forbids 
subtle departures from neutrality, ‘religious gerrymanders,’ as well as 
obvious abuses.”50 
The Supreme Court addressed facial neutrality again in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.51  There, the city had drafted 
vastly underinclusive ordinances to prevent practitioners of Santeria from 
performing animal sacrifices, relying on a pretextual public health 
justification.52  Justice Kennedy pointed out that the law applied to 
essentially no other form of animal slaughter besides Santeria because 
exceptions to the rule were tailored to allow other practices and 
slaughterhouse businesses.53  He found the city’s actions preceding its 
passage of the ordinances evidenced its hostility toward Santeria.54  
Justice Kennedy pulled away the veil of facial neutrality, finding that the 
anti-slaughter laws were not neutral with respect to religion because they 
were motivated by distaste for Santeria.55  In striking them down, he 
wrote, “the Free Exercise Clause protects against government hostility 
which is masked, as well as overt.”56 
The Supreme Court has also condemned discrimination between 
religious denominations. In Larson v. Valente,57 the Supreme Court 
declared “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one 
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”58  
There, the state exempted religious organizations from certain 
registration requirements if they got more than half of their funding 
through charitable donations.59  The law did not specify religions or 
denominations to which it would apply, for instance by differentiating 
between Protestants and Catholics; instead, the law set a standard that the 
legislature thought would provide consumer protection from fraudulent 
charitable solicitations.60  Nevertheless, the Court struck down the 
 
 49.  401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
 50.  Id. at 452 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 696). 
 51.  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 52.  Id. at 547. 
 53.  Id. at 545. 
 54.  Id. at 541. 
 55.  Id. at 542. 
 56.  Id. at 534. 
 57.  456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
 58.  Id. at 244. 
 59.  Id. at 230. 
 60.  Id. at 231–32. 
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distinction because it had the effect of imposing requirements on some 
religious denominations, but not others.61 
The Marsh Court did not apply Larson to Nebraska’s choice of 
clergy.62  Justice Brennan pointed out that Larson, decided shortly before 
Marsh, would have been an apt precedent saying, “I have little doubt that 
the Nebraska practice, at least, would fail the Larson test.”63  However, in 
Greece, the Court expanded on Marsh by incorporating a requirement of 
nondiscrimination in speaker selection.64  This new doctrine implicates 
Larson because discrimination between denominations is a concrete 
example of unconstitutional religious discrimination.  Though Brennan 
was dissenting in Marsh, his observation could offer insight into how 
courts should apply the Greece nondiscrimination principle.  
“Nondiscrimination” calls out for a workable definition, so precedents 
like Larson and Lukumi Babalu Aye that apply nondiscrimination principles 
in the religious context seem to be the most logical place to look for clarity.  
The Fourth Circuit, at least, saw value in this approach when citing Larson 
in a recent legislative prayer decision.65 
3. Lower Court Decisions Post-Greece 
 
Federal courts have interpreted Greece’s mandates in myriad and at 
times directly contradictory ways.  The inconsistency of these lower court 
decisions reflects the need for clarification of Greece’s standards through 
the application of existing Establishment Clause principles.  In Bormuth v. 
County of Jackson, the Sixth Circuit upheld a county commission’s practice 
of having the commissioners themselves offer invocations on a rotating 
basis.66  They relied heavily on facial neutrality: 
The Board’s invocation practice is facially neutral regarding 
religion.  On a rotating basis, each elected Jackson County 
Commissioner, regardless of his religion (or lack thereof), is 
afforded an opportunity to open a session with a short 
invocation based on the dictates of his own conscience.  Neither 
other Commissioners, nor the Board as a whole, review or 
approve the content of the invocations.  There is no evidence that 
the Board adopted this practice with any discriminatory intent.67 
 
 61.  Id. at 255. 
 62.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
 63.  Id. at 801 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 64.  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585–86. 
 65.  Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 66.  Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 67.  Id. at 498. 
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The court interpreted the nondiscrimination mandate to bar 
discriminatory intent and censorship, but expressly held that the county 
was not required to seek out prayers from individuals of other faiths.68 
That someone of a different faith could be elected to the county 
commission and offer an invocation satisfied the Bormuth court’s standard 
of nondiscrimination. This reasoning is in tension with Greece’s 
nondiscrimination policy and seems to stop at facial neutrality when 
Larson and Lukumi Babalu Aye appear to require more. 
The Fourth Circuit reviewed a strikingly similar case, where county 
commissioners offered prayers to begin meetings.69  Contrary to the Sixth 
Circuit’s approach, the court found that limiting the class of prayer givers 
to commissioners was inconsistent with Greece.70  Though the court’s 
opinion focused heavily on the risk of politicizing religious faith, it also 
observed that, “instead of embracing religious pluralism and the 
possibility of a correspondingly diverse invocation practice, Rowan 
County’s commissioners created a ‘closed-universe’ of prayer-givers 
dependent solely on election outcomes.”71  The court also found that “a 
tapestry of many faiths” represented in the invocation practice would 
lessen the appearance that the county has aligned itself with any one 
religion.72  These completely opposing approaches to speaker selection 
demonstrate the need for a cleaner definition of nondiscrimination. 
Federal district courts have also taken on speaker selection issues.  
For instance, the Middle District of Florida struck down Brevard County’s 
practice of barring nontheists from giving invocations.73  The Middle 
District of Pennsylvania reached the same conclusion when it examined 
the state House of Representatives’ invocation practice, saying: “[t]he 
House’s selection process invites members of the public to serve as guest 
chaplains but draws a qualifying line of demarcation between theistic and 
nontheistic belief systems.  This is a horse of a different color from prayer 
practices previously found to be consistent with history and tradition.”74  
These courts took a broad view of Greece’s nondiscrimination mandate, 
suggesting that the prayer opportunity must be offered to citizens with a 
wide range of beliefs. 
 
 68.  See id. at 514 (“Marsh and Town of Greece do not require Jackson County to 
provide opportunities for persons of other faiths to offer invocations.”). 
 69.  Lund, 863 F.3d at 272. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 282 (quoting Lund v. Rowan Cty., 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 723 (M.D.N.C. 
2015)). 
 72.  Id. at 284. 
 73.  Williamson v. Brevard County, 276 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1283–84 (M.D. Fla. 
2017). 
 74.  Fields v. Speaker of Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 327 F. Supp. 
3d 748, 757 (M.D. Pa. 2018). 
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By contrast, the Eastern District of Tennessee found no constitutional 
problem with a county commission’s regime limiting the opportunity to 
give an invocation to “eligible member[s] of the clergy.”75  In support of 
its holding that religion may be favored over non-religion, the court 
emphasized that the legislative prayer context is distinct from the main 
line of Establishment Clause jurisprudence because of its unique history.76  
Flowing from this premise the court found that “while legislative bodies 
cannot intentionally discriminate against particular faith systems, they 
can require that invocation givers have some religious credentials.”77  
These wildly disparate interpretations of Marsh and Greece suggest that 
the standards set forth in those cases are vague enough to act as Rorschach 
tests for lower courts. 
IV.  THE HUNT COURT’S STRENGTHS AND POINTS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
This analysis begins by highlighting the strengths of the Hunt 
opinion.  We then examine some of the important similarities and 
differences between Hunt and other lower court opinions.  Finally, we 
conclude by examining some of the important remaining challenges left 
for Alaska courts to examine. 
The Hunt court was largely successful in applying the limited 
Supreme Court precedent, to create a set of boundaries to assess the 
Assembly’s policy.  The Hunt court accurately tracked the language and 
spirit of Greece by citing the purpose of legislative prayer to be one of 
uniting people of many faiths in “a community of tolerance and 
devotion.”78  And it emphasized the importance that Marsh and Greece 
placed on invocations being before “adults not readily susceptible to 
religious indoctrination.”79  Perhaps most importantly, in striking down 
the Assembly’s policy, the court applied the holding established in Greece 
that sectarian invocations are constitutional only if “a policy of 
nondiscrimination is maintained.”80  Indeed, the Assembly’s requirement 
that interested candidates be a member of a “religious association[] with 
an established presence” that “regularly meet[s]” seems to be precisely 
tailored to discriminate against atheism and minority faiths.81 
 
 75.  Coleman v. Hamilton County, 104 F. Supp. 3d 877, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 2015). 
 76.  Id. at 889–90. 
 77.  Id. at 890. 
 78.  Hunt v. Kenai Borough Peninsula, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 17 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with author) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 
566). 
 79.  Id. at 13. 
 80.  Id. at 3. 
 81.  Id. at 5. 
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The Hunt court’s reasoning is in some ways consistent with at least 
one federal case involving strikingly similar facts.  In Coleman, the Eastern 
District of Tennessee found Hamilton County’s prayer policy to be within 
the confines of Marsh and Greece despite the County’s requirement that 
members be a part of a “religious congregation[] with an established 
presence in Hamilton County.”82  The court upheld the policy because the 
plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of intentional or unintentional 
discrimination against “particular faith systems.”83  In both Coleman and 
Hunt, great emphasis was placed on the importance of discrimination 
against certain faiths, which explains the different results between the two 
cases.  The Hunt court held that the purpose of the Assembly’s policy was 
to exclude controversial minority faiths without one of the valid Greece 
purposes.84  This decision is consistent with Greece, which favors the 
inclusion of various faiths provided that their members not take the 
invocation opportunity to advance their own, or disparage another’s, 
belief system.85 
However, Coleman identifies an important gap in the Hunt court’s 
reasoning.  In Coleman, the plaintiff claimed not to represent any 
particular faith, and the court held that the Establishment Clause does not 
prohibit requiring that an individual “have some religious credentials.”86  
In Hunt, one of the plaintiffs, Lance Hunt, identified as an atheist.87  While 
the Hunt court acknowledged that the Assembly’s policy discriminated 
against disfavored religious groups,88 it neglected to address whether the 
exclusion of an atheist violates this principle.  The reasoning in Coleman, 
and even Hunt’s own reasoning, seem to interpret Greece as requiring the 
inclusion of diverse faiths.89  Neither decision interprets Greece as 
requiring the inclusion of any person who wishes to provide an 
invocation. 
Another point which lacks clarification in Hunt was exemplified in 
Bormuth.  There, the Sixth Circuit was satisfied that the standards of Marsh 
and Greece were met because the policy at issue was not discriminatory 
on its face.90  In contrast, though the Hunt court did not explicitly address 
the issue of implicit or facial discrimination, the court’s reasoning implies 
 
 82.  Coleman v. Hamilton County, 104 F. Supp. 3d 877, 880, 890 (E.D. Tenn. 
2015). 
 83.  Id. at 890. 
 84.  Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 17–18. 
 85.  Id. at 16–17. 
 86.  104 F. Supp. 3d, at 881, 890. 
 87.  Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 5 n.4. 
 88.  Id. at 16–17. 
 89.  See, e.g., Coleman, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 890; Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 
16–17. 
 90.  Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 514. 
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that either would be sufficient to violate Alaska’s Establishment Clause.91  
The Assembly’s policy was not discriminatory on its face, but the Hunt 
court pointed to extrinsic evidence, such as the Assembly’s own 
statements, which demonstrated the discriminatory nature of the 
Assembly’s policy.  Establishing this outright would provide helpful 
guidance for future decisions. 
Hunt also usefully demonstrates that the intensely fact specific 
nature of a legislative prayer inquiry requires tailoring the non-
discrimination principle’s application to the nature of the locale.  
Legislative prayer inquiries involve an examination of the way a 
legislative body’s speaker selection policy interacts with the local 
community’s demographic makeup, geography, and culture.  The Greece 
court was clear that local governments do not have to look outside their 
borders to create religious balancing, but must maintain a policy of 
nondiscrimination within their borders.92  Because every locality is 
different, a policy that fosters nondiscrimination in one place might result 
in discrimination if it were applied elsewhere.  A comparison of the 
speaker selection policies examined in Hunt and Coleman vividly 
illustrates this phenomenon.  They both required affiliation with a faith 
group that had an established presence in the community.  However, 
Hamilton County has a population of about 361,500 people distributed 
over around 542 square miles (roughly 620 people per square mile).93  
And Kenai Peninsula Borough has a population of about 58,600 people 
and a land area of about 16,075 square miles (roughly 3.5 people per 
square mile).94  This drastic difference in density is significant when 
considering a speaker selection policy that requires an established 
presence in the community.  Where people are more concentrated, it is 
easier for them to create established presences.  Where people are more 
dispersed, a policy that requires an institutional presence creates a greater 
risk of discrimination against minority faiths. 
The superior court’s decision in Hunt also implicitly acknowledges 
important First Amendment principles from outside Marsh and Greece: 
avoidance of religious gerrymanders and facially neutral discrimination 
between denominations.  The superior court in Hunt struck down the 
speaker selection policy because it found from the record that 1) some 
 
 91.  See Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 17–18. 
 92.  572 U.S. at 585–86. 
 93.  QuickFacts Hamilton County, Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 1, 2017), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/hamiltoncountytennessee,US/
PST045217 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
 94.  QuickFacts Kenai Peninsula Borough, Alaska, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 1, 
2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/kenaipeninsula 
boroughalaska/PST045217 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
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prior invocations had been controversial, 2) that the speaker selection 
policy was created in response to this controversy, and 3) the purpose of 
the policy was to prevent future invocations of a similar nature.95  This 
describes exactly the kind of reasoning the U.S. Supreme Court applied 
to bar a facially neutral religious gerrymander in Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye. In the future, courts should flesh out this implicit 
acknowledgement to create a workable doctrine regarding speaker 
selection.  Importing the prohibitions on religious gerrymanders and 
discrimination between denominations to the island of legislative prayer 
jurisprudence would clarify the doctrine of speaker selection.  These 
independently established principles could mitigate the scattershot 
interpretations lower courts have placed on the mandates of Marsh and 
Greece. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Hunt the superior court interpreted Marsh and Greece to strike 
down an invocation speaker selection policy that was tailored to exclude 
disfavored beliefs.  The case and its circumstances offer a demonstration 
of how murky the directives of Marsh and Greece can be in practice.  Trial 
courts are called upon to interpret broad questions of intent and decide 
what kinds of policies are discriminatory without much direction.  For 
this reason, it is important for courts to consult other cornerstone 
establishment clause nondiscrimination principles to clarify legislative 
prayer doctrine.  Though each case will remain highly fact specific, 
consistently applicable principles should be developed. 
 
 
 95.  Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 17–18. 
